BY DANA SAVAGE AND JAY T. CONRAD
Public records exist to help ensure government accountability and transparency, prevent corruption, improve public health, and create an individual’s legal identity. Access to court or administrative hearings, state licensing processes, and health services depends upon the integrity of government records, including a person’s accurate identity documents. However, accuracy is not the only consideration when it comes to these records. Privacy is also direly important, particularly for more vulnerable populations like transgender, non-binary, and intersex individuals. When people in these groups have their sex designation information revealed in public records, for example, they are immediately put at risk for harassment, bullying, discrimination, and violence.
In Washington state, there is a growing recognition of the dangers inherent in unprotected government data. In an effort to protect vulnerable groups and secure confidentiality of identity documents, the state Legislature passed Senate Bill 6081 earlier this year.
At its core, SB 6081, which took effect on March 16, 2026, is a targeted data privacy measure designed to protect individuals from the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive identity information within official government databases. Specifically, SB 6081 amends Washington’s Public Records Act and other related statutes to exempt current sex designations, historic sex designation changes, and any supporting documentation held by the Department of Licensing and Department of Health from public inspection and copying. Crucially, the bill prohibits these agencies from transmitting a person’s sex designation change history to other jurisdictions or displaying any indicator of a past change on newly issued credentials without explicit, specific consent.
By formally severing the publicly accessible link between a person’s current legal identity and their sex assigned at birth, SB 6081 preempts the ability of hostile actors—be they out-of-state agencies, data brokers, or private individuals—to leverage transparency laws as tools for surveillance. It ensures that the vital administrative process of aligning one’s documentation with one’s lived reality does not inadvertently generate a permanent, public registry of transgender identity. In securing this data, SB 6081 serves as a safeguard against public records being used to expose, track, or facilitate systemic discrimination against Washington’s transgender community.
Washington is not alone in these efforts. States such as California, Oregon, and New York are actively working to fortify the privacy of the record to shield vulnerable populations, such as immigrants and LGBTQIA+ individuals.11 See, e.g., S.B. 107, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2022); H.B. 2002, 82nd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2023); S. 2475B, 2023-2024 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2023). These protections, unfortunately, remain isolated firewalls within a rapidly escalating national crisis. Beyond the borders of a few limited havens, a starkly different reality is unfolding wherein the administrative mechanisms are being intentionally deployed not to safeguard civil rights, but to systematically dismantle them.
The urgency of sealing these state-level vulnerabilities becomes starkly evident when considering the broader national landscape, where the weaponization of identity documentation is being actively pursued.22 Geoff Mulvihill, AP, “Justice Department Demanded Details on Transgender Patients From at Least 1 Hospital,” PBS NewsHour (Aug. 21, 2025), www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/justice-department-demanded-details-on-transgender-patients-from-at-least-1-hospital (reporting on federal investigative demands for granular medical data regarding transgender patients and the resulting implications for healthcare privacy). For example, consider the most recent legislative efforts across multiple jurisdictions to restrict transgender and nonbinary individuals from updating their legal gender markers on state-issued IDs and birth certificates.33 See Endnotes 5-9. By legislatively manufacturing a schism between a person’s lived identity and their official documentation, the state is effectively mandating how that person exists and—more importantly—how they cannot exist.
SB 6081 amends Washington’s Public Records Act and other related statutes to exempt current sex designations, historic sex designation changes, and any supporting documentation.
This bureaucratic erasure causes daily, systemic friction and deprives individuals of access to secure housing, employment, and state-issued benefits. Other risks are also created, such as in Kansas, where all transgender Kansans who had updated their gender markers suddenly had their legal right to drive and vote placed into constitutional limbo overnight and with no notice.44 S.B. 244, 2026 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2026). In at least one case, a driver’s license was reportedly invalidated for a trans person despite their having not changed their gender marker.55 Nate Zuke, “She’d never Changed her Gender Marker. Kansas Invalidated Her License Anyway,”Assigned Media (Mar. 3, 2026), www.assignedmedia.org/breaking-news/kansas-revokes-license-no-gender-change. They were still able to be tracked and have their identity dismantled.
Sadly, many states are taking further steps to identify, document, and categorically surveil then erase transgender individuals. Wyoming recently became the ninth state to ban gender marker changes on driver’s licenses.66 H.B. 32, 68th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2025). As of the drafting of this article, Tennessee is in the process of building its own database of individuals it knows to be transgender.77 H.B. 754 / S.B. 676, 114th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2026). Just over our border, Idaho passed two laws in 2024, one that narrowly defines “sex” as either male or female, and one that allows government officials, including public school teachers, to refuse to address individuals by their pronouns.88 H.B. 421, 67th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2024); H.B. 538, 67th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2024). More recently, a federal judge ruled that Idaho can move forward with preventing transgender people from changing their gender markers on their birth certificates.99 https://idahocapitalsun.com/2026/01/09/federal-judge-rules-idaho-can-prevent-transgender-people-from-changing-sex-on-birth-certificate/. Likewise, in Texas, laws have been passed that restrictively define “sex” and that require electronic health records to list a person’s “biological sex as either male or female.”1010 H.B. 229, 89th Leg., (Texas 2025); S.B. 1188, 89th Leg., (Texas 2025). Additionally, the Texas Department of Public Safety issued a memo in 2024 to defy court orders mandating gender marker changes on driver’s licenses and state IDs.1111 https://guides.sll.texas.gov/identity-documents/correcting-errors. Florida has taken similar steps, with the state Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issuing a memo in 2024 rescinding a policy allowing Floridians to update their gender markers on driver’s licenses and ID cards.1212 https://s3.documentcloud.org documents/ 24424120/ir08-gender-requirements-12624-memo.pdf.
For transgender individuals and other marginalized groups, the public nature of identity-related records—specifically sex-designation-change information—has become a structural vulnerability. SB 6081 arrived not merely as a basic correction to the way we manage sensitive data, but as a necessary shield against a form of systemic harm that is emerging in importance: the use of public records and personal data to facilitate administrative discrimination, erasure, and exposure to direct harm. SB 6081 is an important first step toward protecting individuals from systemic abuse by vesting within them alone the privilege to such sensitive information as their historic sex-designation information—rather than leave them unguarded within institutions holding those public records in public trust.
Federal legislation currently under consideration could have even broader impacts. The controversial federal SAVE Act sought to require all states to match one’s voter registration and ID with that of their birth certificate.1313 See Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act, H.R. 8281, 118th Cong. (2024). Proponents of the bill say that it would support election security, while others warn that it could effectively disenfranchise people who changed names due to marriage, convenience, or to escape an abuser. The constitutionality of the potential legislation remains a question, as some U.S. Supreme Court justices have expressed concern over similar tactics in the past, calling them poll taxes1414 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079 (1966); See also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 211–16, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (Arguing that the financial costs and administrative hurdles of obtaining underlying records, such as a birth certificate, to secure a mandatory voter ID impose an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, disproportionately impacting marginalized voters). that force voters to pay their state of origin to ensure consistent documentation from birth to the ballot box. Some states expressly disallow these necessary document updates (especially if you happen to be transgender and were born in a jurisdiction that has outlawed gender changes on official records).
The weaponization of the physical record is, however, only the visible tip of the spear. In the digital age, “the record” has expanded far beyond birth certificates and driver’s licenses; it is now a sprawling, ubiquitous assemblage of our search histories, geolocation pings, financial transactions, and biometric data. Without robust data privacy protections, this invisible digital record becomes an even more potent tool for discrimination. When the state—or the data brokers it increasingly collaborates with—can compile unregulated digital dossiers, marginalized identities are often the first to experience its worst effects. They are not just erased; they can be actively hunted, categorized, and penalized without due process.1515 Kat Lonsdorf, Jude Joffe-Block, Meg Anderson, “ICE has spun a massive surveillance web. We talked to people caught in it,” NPR (Mar. 4, 2026), www.npr.org/2026/03/04/nx-s1-5717031/ice-dhs-immigrants-surveillance-confrontation-deportation-mobile-fortify (detailing the Department of Homeland Security’s escalation of mobile surveillance and its resulting confrontations during interior immigration enforcement and deportation operations).
Bad faith actors utilizing targeted collection of demographic data to marginalize specific populations is not a novel phenomenon; rather, these historical patterns of discrimination are simply finding new expression in digital spaces. Yet state-backed harms can and do cut much deeper than familiar continuations of systemic discrimination, and indeed are carried out with more intentionality. For example, beyond purchasing commercial data, Immigration and Customs Enforcement circumvents traditional privacy safeguards by utilizing administrative subpoenas to compel sensitive data disclosures without judicial oversight.1616 John Woodrow Cox, “Homeland Security is Targeting Americans With This Secret Legal Weapon,” Wash. Post (Feb. 3, 2026), www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/02/03/homeland-security-administrative-subpoena/ (detailing the Department of Homeland Security’s reliance on administrative subpoenas to circumvent judicial oversight and compel the disclosure of sensitive personal data). Simultaneously, ICE is establishing round-the-clock social media surveillance operations to continuously monitor targeted populations.1717 Dell Cameron, “ICE Wants to Build Out a 24/7 Social Media Surveillance Team,” Wired (Oct. 3, 2025), www.wired.com/story/ice-social-media-surveillance-24-7-contract/ (reporting on the agency’s efforts to establish a continuous, round-the-clock surveillance unit dedicated to monitoring social media platforms to aid in immigration enforcement and targeting).
Data privacy provides a unique means of bolstering against modernized, digitized discrimination and harm. But securing data such that it cannot be misused for malicious ends means more than increased cybersecurity and firewalls; it means real, tangible change to the ways that data is collected and used in the first place.
Digital privacy is important. Why? Some may argue that data privacy is “dead”—an impossibility in today’s digitized society. Contrarily, though, the digitization of society lends itself to a great need for data privacy, and data privacy can always be achieved at some level, even after massive amounts of data have already been swept up in the clutches of huge tech conglomerates and governmental agencies. SB 6081 is just one example of what is possible with a little creative problem solving.
By restricting access to and use of existing data, greater privacy can be achieved. Furthermore, additional data collection can be stopped in its tracks—were the law to account for this, of course. Restrictions on how data can be combined, particularly through the use of artificial intelligence, is another mechanism for improving privacy. Regulations that achieve these aims are still possible to implement in a digital culture, as seen in the 144 (out of 193) countries that have enacted data protection regulations in the last decade. Privacy need not be a matter of if and how so much as it can be a matter of when and to what extent. And with more privacy comes more protection from exploitation, targeting, and harm.
Washington state is, thankfully, increasingly recognizing the urgency of this paradigm shift. Lawmakers are moving to enact robust, sector-specific privacy frameworks where broader federal measures have fallen short or are directly antagonistic to the notion of autonomy through data privacy. The recent passage of the My Health Data Act, for instance, marked a nation-leading effort to tightly regulate the collection, sharing, and geofencing of sensitive consumer health data, explicitly encompassing reproductive and gender-affirming care. The legislative momentum acknowledges a critical reality: Better privacy norms are needed. Absent these protections, the modern digital ecosystem defaults to the commodification and exploitation of personal vulnerabilities.
Yet, regulating private data brokers addresses only one side of the privacy equation. The state itself is a prolific collector of deeply personal data, heavily governed by the Washington Public Records Act, which was designed to ensure government transparency—not individual privacy. When the good intentions of this act are obliterated by bad actors harvesting Washington’s own databases, the legal framework must evolve to distinguish between holding the government accountable and leaving its citizens dangerously exposed.
As stewards of the justice system, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars bear a profound obligation to recognize and act to combat the misuse of the record. We can no longer afford to view data privacy as a niche regulatory specialty or a mere compliance checklist. It is a fundamental civil rights imperative for the 21st century. As practitioners, we must actively advocate for data minimization in discovery, champion the confidentiality of vulnerable clients in public filings, and stay in the know about legislative reforms that close exploitative loopholes. Clients must be informed of their rights, including under SB 6081, in the appropriate situations. Likewise, the judiciary must critically evaluate the developing nature of the record, ensuring that procedural rules and transparency mandates are not manipulated to facilitate the very harms the justice system is sworn to prevent.
The time to fortify the record is now, before the tools of recognition are irreversibly turned into engines of erasure.
About the authorS
Jay T. Conrad is a Ph.D. student at the University of Washington specializing in international data privacy regulations. They received their LL.M. in Technology Law & Policy from Georgetown University Law Center in 2024 and their J.D. from Seattle University School of Law in 2023. They recently co-authored SB 6081, which passed into law in March 2026. They are currently a Hazelton Fellow at the University of Washington School of Law’s Technology Law & Public Policy Clinic. Reach them at:
Dana Savage is an assistant attorney general in the Washington State Attorney General’s Office, in the Torts Division’s Seattle office. In this role, she serves as a trial attorney representing the state of Washington and its agencies, officers, and employees against tort claims and lawsuits. Savage also serves on several internal AGO workgroups tasked with advising and preparing state agencies for federal litigation concerning issues arising out of Washington state’s robust LGBTQIA+ legal protections. She is a past-president (2020-21) and vice president of issues & advocacy (2018-2020) of QLAW Bar Association. Most recently, she co-authored SB 6081 (2026), which was sponsored and stewarded by Senator Jaime Pedersen. You may reach her at:
NOTES
1. See, e.g., S.B. 107, 2021-2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2022); H.B. 2002, 82nd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2023); S. 2475B, 2023-2024 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2023).
2. Geoff Mulvihill, AP, “Justice Department Demanded Details on Transgender Patients From at Least 1 Hospital,” PBS NewsHour (Aug. 21, 2025), www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/justice-department-demanded-details-on-transgender-patients-from-at-least-1-hospital (reporting on federal investigative demands for granular medical data regarding transgender patients and the resulting implications for healthcare privacy).
3. See Endnotes 5-9.
4. S.B. 244, 2026 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2026).
5. Nate Zuke, “She’d never Changed her Gender Marker. Kansas Invalidated Her License Anyway,”Assigned Media (Mar. 3, 2026), www.assignedmedia.org/breaking-news/kansas-revokes-license-no-gender-change.
6. H.B. 32, 68th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2025).
7. H.B. 754 / S.B. 676, 114th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2026).
8. H.B. 421, 67th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2024); H.B. 538, 67th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2024).
10. H.B. 229, 89th Leg., (Texas 2025); S.B. 1188, 89th Leg., (Texas 2025).
11. https://guides.sll.texas.gov/identity-documents/correcting-errors.
12. https://s3.documentcloud.org documents/ 24424120/ir08-gender-requirements-12624-memo.pdf.
13. See Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act, H.R. 8281, 118th Cong. (2024).
14. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079 (1966); See also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 211–16, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (Arguing that the financial costs and administrative hurdles of obtaining underlying records, such as a birth certificate, to secure a mandatory voter ID impose an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, disproportionately impacting marginalized voters).
15. Kat Lonsdorf, Jude Joffe-Block, Meg Anderson, “ICE has spun a massive surveillance web. We talked to people caught in it,” NPR (Mar. 4, 2026), www.npr.org/2026/03/04/nx-s1-5717031/ice-dhs-immigrants-surveillance-confrontation-deportation-mobile-fortify (detailing the Department of Homeland Security’s escalation of mobile surveillance and its resulting confrontations during interior immigration enforcement and deportation operations).
16. John Woodrow Cox, “Homeland Security is Targeting Americans With This Secret Legal Weapon,” Wash. Post (Feb. 3, 2026), www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2026/02/03/homeland-security-administrative-subpoena/ (detailing the Department of Homeland Security’s reliance on administrative subpoenas to circumvent judicial oversight and compel the disclosure of sensitive personal data).
17. Dell Cameron, “ICE Wants to Build Out a 24/7 Social Media Surveillance Team,” Wired (Oct. 3, 2025), www.wired.com/story/ice-social-media-surveillance-24-7-contract/ (reporting on the agency’s efforts to establish a continuous, round-the-clock surveillance unit dedicated to monitoring social media platforms to aid in immigration enforcement and targeting).